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“Too much medicine”: insights and explanations from economic theory 
and research. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Increasing attention has been paid in recent years to the problem of “too 
much medicine”, whereby patients receive unnecessary investigations and 
treatments providing them with little or no benefit, but which expose them to 
risks of harm.  Despite this phenomenon potentially constituting an inefficient 
use of health care resources, it has received limited direct attention from 
health economists. 
 
This paper considers “too much medicine” as a form of overconsumption, 
drawing on research from health economics, behavioural economics and 
ecological economics to identify possible explanations for and drivers of 
overconsumption.   
 
We define overconsumption of health care as a situation in which individuals 
consume in a way that undermines their own well-being.  Extensive health 
economics research since the 1960s has provided clear evidence that 
physicians do not act as perfect agents for patients, and there are perverse 
incentives for them to provide unnecessary services under various 
circumstances.  There is strong evidence of the existence of supplier-induced 
demand, and of the impact of various forms of financial incentives on clinical 
practice.  The behavioural economics evidence provides rich insights on why 
clinical practice may depart from an “evidence-based” approach.  Moreover, 
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behavioural findings on health professionals’ strategies for dealing with 
uncertainty, and for avoiding potential regret, provide powerful explanations of 
why overuse and overtreatment may frequently appear to be the “rational” 
choice in clinical decision-making, even when they cause harm. The 
ecological economics literature suggests that status or positional competition 
can, via the principal-agent relationship in health care, provide a further force 
driving overconsumption.   
 
This novel synthesis of economic perspectives suggests important scope for 
interdisciplinary collaboration; signals potentially important issues for health 
technology assessment and health technology management policies; and 
suggests that cultural change might be required to achieve significant shifts in 
clinical behaviour. 
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Introduction 
 
In recent years, a movement of health professionals, researchers and 
consumer advocates has coalesced, focusing on the harms of overdiagnosis 
and overtreatment (Macdonald & Loder 2015).  This movement has adopted 
the label “too much medicine” to refer to the general phenomenon of 
unnecessary investigations and interventions given to patients who will not 
benefit from them, and who will be exposed to the risk of harm and 
medicalisation along the way (Carter et al. 2015).  The primary motivation for 
this growing attention is the desire to avoid exposing patients to unnecessary 
harm; however, this phenomenon also possesses a significant economic 
dimension (Welch, Schwartz & Woloshin 2011).  
 
Certain aspects of this phenomenon have received direct attention from an 
economic perspective, for example overutilisation (Behnke et al. 2013) and 
“low value care” (O'Callaghan, Meyer & Elshaug 2015; Schwartz et al. 2014).  
Yet the overall concept of the harmful overconsumption of health care has 
received little attention from health economists, and appears to be 
significantly less prominent in the cost-effectiveness and health technology 
assessment literatures than might have been expected given its obvious 
implication – if resources are currently expended which yield no benefit (or 
cause harm), they could clearly be conserved with no loss of benefit to 
patients. 
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Methods 
 
A detailed literature search was undertaken to review the definitions and 
characteristics of different forms of overconsumption of healthcare, in order to 
develop a working definition of this phenomenon.  The online databases Web 
of Science (Core Content) and PubMed were searched using the following 
terms:  overdiag* NEAR/10 defin*; overdiagnosis NEAR10 definition; 
overtreat* NEAR/10 defin*; overtreatment NEAR10 definition; overus* 
NEAR/10 defin*; overuse NEAR10 definition; overutil* NEAR/10 defin*; 
overutil* NEAR10 definition.  EconLit was then searched to provide an entry 
point to the wider health economics, behavioural economics, ecological 
economics, and sustainable consumption literatures, using the following 
search terms: consumption AND (health OR healthcare) AND theory; 
overconsumption; sustainable AND consumption. 
 
In addition, hand searches for follow-on references were undertaken of books 
and articles already in hand, and from key texts identified in the online search. 
The paper then reviews and discusses the literature thus identified, first to 
situate these phenomena in the broader economic context, and then to 
examine potential economic explanations emerging from this review.  Key 
findings and their possible implications are then summarised, as a foundation 
for commencing a broader debate on the economics of the overconsumption 
of health care. 
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Defining Overconsumption in Health Care 
 
The largest category of literature identified related to overdiagnosis, most 
frequently in the context of cancer screening programmes ((Marcus et al. 
2015; Marmot et al. 2012),  but also more widely (Carter et al. 2015; 
Moynihan, Henry & Moons 2014; Welch, Schwartz & Woloshin 2011). 
Overdiagnosis occurs when ‘illnesses’ are diagnosed which - if they had 
remained undiagnosed - would never have caused patients harm, with the 
consequence that patients are exposed to unnecessary treatments for which  
risks outweigh benefits. 
 
A number of authors consider the problem of overtreatment (Carter et al. 
2015; Moynihan, Henry & Moons 2014), or the use of unnecessary clinical 
services or interventions which provide negligible benefit, so that harm 
outweighs any small benefit in virtually all cases.  This definition is highly 
contiguous with definitions of overuse (Beckman 2011; Segal et al. 2015) or 
overutilisation (Behnke et al. 2013).  Overuse (or overtreatment) thus 
represents an “error of commission” in which services with a poor benefit to 
risk profile are provided to patients (Chan et al. 2013). 
 
A closely related concept which begins to incorporate aspects of cost or value 
is that of low value care, defined as “…practices that are, at best, of little to no 
clinical utility and, in certain situations, harmful” (O'Callaghan, Meyer & 
Elshaug 2015, p. 175) or “…care that was likely to provide minimal or no 
	 7	
benefit on average” (Schwartz et al. 2014, p. 1073).  In similar vein is the idea 
of questionable care , described most simply as “…treatments…that do not 
work, and may do harm”  (Duckett, S et al. 2015, p. 2). 
 
The concept of “pharmaceuticalisation” was also identified in the recent 
literature as involving “…the transformation of human conditions, capabilities 
and capacities into opportunities for pharmaceutical intervention” (Gabe et al. 
2015, p. 193) .  This concept has also been related to situations in which 
medicine use ceases to be rational, fails to confer benefits and/or risks harms 
without concomitant benefits (Busfield 2015), noting the growing importance 
of pharmaceuticalisation as medications are increasingly used preventively in 
broad populations, not just in the sick. Pharmaceuticalisation is clearly a 
cousin of “overmedicalisation”, most famously propounded in the 1970s by 
Ivan Illich (Illich 1976).  This can be described as “…altering the meaning or 
understanding of experiences, so that human problems are re-interpreted as 
medical problems requiring medical treatment, without net benefit to patients 
or citizens”  (Carter et al. 2015, p. 5). 
 
A common feature of all these terms is that they describe phenomena in 
which resources are used unnecessarily, with little or no benefit, and often 
with potential to cause harm.  
 
Contextualising “too much medicine’ within the economics literature 
 
As a first step, it is helpful to consider how the phenomenon of “too much 
medicine” relates to a number of core concepts within the ecological and 
	 8	
sustainable economics and health economics literatures, before reviewing 
specific parts of this literature in more detail.  It has long been recognised that 
health care markets display a number of significant special characteristics that 
differentiate them from a perfectly competitive market (Arrow 1963), including 
pervasive uncertainty, unavoidable information asymmetries, and the need for 
principal-agent relationships.  Subsequent discussion will draw heavily on 
these identified departures from the “standard” model of perfect competition. 
 
Implicit in the very idea of “too much medicine” is the need to ask the 
question: too much relative to what?  An orthodox economic approach to this 
question implicitly compares the consumer surplus generated by the actual 
health care market (with all its acknowledged imperfections) with the 
consumer surplus that would have been generated by a perfectly competitive 
market (Peacock & Richardson 2007).  A second approach to this question 
argues that moral hazard means those with insurance will consume more 
health care than if they were uninsured – and that the overall effect of such 
additional consumption on economic welfare is negative (Frick & Chernew 
2009).  Neither of these approaches explicitly address any negative impacts 
of overconsumption, but appeal directly to orthodox notions of consumer 
surplus.   
 
By contrast, a third implicit approach to the question of “how much is too 
much” compares actual consumption with need for care as defined by 
appropriate expert evidence or opinion (Boulding 1966; Deber, Hollander & 
	 9	
Jacobs 2008).  The defining feature “too much medicine” set out above is the 
provision of treatments which provide no significant benefit and may also 
cause harm – so by implication, such treatments should never be considered 
as “needed” if evaluated correctly.  Similarly, when viewed through the lens of 
cost-effectiveness analysis, “too much medicine” will deliver no incremental 
benefits (and may reduce overall benefits through causing harm), but will incur 
the additional costs of these unnecessary interventions.  It therefore 
represents care that is less effective and more costly than available 
alternatives – hence it will always be dominated in cost-effectiveness terms by 
other strategies (Drummond et al. 2015).  
 
The ecological and sustainable economics literatures offer some alternative 
approaches to considering the same question, i.e. overconsumption relative to 
what benchmark?   Much of this literature focuses on aggregate measures, to 
consider whether total consumption is or is not excessive in relation either to 
intertemporal social welfare (i.e. maximizing the present value of current and 
future utility from consumption) or sustainability, i.e. the ability of the economy 
to maintain human living standards or social well-being without their declining 
over the long run (Arrow et al. 2004; Dasgupta 2010).  Others explicitly frame 
this question in terms of whether humanity is consuming too much for the rest 
of the planet (Daly et al. 2007).  
 
Princen suggests two useful concepts in this space (Princen 1999).  He 
defines overconsumption as being that aggregate “…level or quality of 
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consumption which undermines a species’ own life support system and for 
which individuals and communities have choices in their consuming patterns” 
(Princen 1999, p. 357).  Individual or community consumption decisions may 
be rational, but lead eventually to ecological catastrophe.  He also defines an 
individual level concept, misconsumption, which occurs when individuals 
consume in a way that undermines their own well-being – “…individual 
resource-using acts that result in net losses for the individual” (ibid, p. 357).  
Princen suggests that a critical opportunity therefore emerges in identifying 
those forms of individual misconsumption (which harm the individual 
consumer) which also lead to collective overconsumption. 
 
Princen’s concepts of overconsumption and misconsumption (Princen 1999) 
can helpfully frame two alternative lenses for considering the 
overconsumption of health care.  A focus on collective overconsumption 
requires consideration of health care’s overall material or resource throughput 
(Daly et al. 2007; Sorman & Giampietro 2013).  This perspective accounts for 
all negative impacts and negative externalities throughout the production 
chain of health care, incorporating all energy, natural resource consumption 
and pollution effects – whether or not the end products of health care are 
beneficial to the health status of individual patients or society as a whole.  It is 
worth noting that the problem of “too much medicine” may itself be a 
contributor to Daly’s aggregate concept of “uneconomic growth” (Daly 2005).  
According to Daly, uneconomic growth occurs when continuing increases in 
production (i.e. economic growth) come at a cost in reduced welfare or 
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environmental depletion that is greater than the value of the additional 
production.  Increasing overdiagnosis and overtreatment would represent 
precisely such a phenomenon – excess treatment is counted as contributing 
to economic growth, but its contribution to well-being is, in fact, zero or 
negative. 
 
Viewed through the “interpretive layer” of individual misconsumption proposed 
by Princen (1999) however, the focus narrows to that consumption of health 
care which results in net losses to the individual.  The working definition of 
“too much medicine” (the consumption of health care that brings risk of harm 
for little or no appreciable benefit) is, arguably, very much an example of 
Princen’s concept of misconsumption.  A focus on misconsumption therefore 
involves a more specific focus on the costs, harms and benefits of specific 
interventions.  Given the focus of the “too much medicine” movement on 
preventing individuals from suffering harm through unnecessary treatment, 
this paper will concentrate on examining health care from the misconsumption 
perspective – that is, the more direct impact on individual health and well-
being of “too much medicine” – and will not pursue the aggregate perspective 
further.  It is important to note that Princen’s concept of misconsumption does 
not directly address one important characteristic of health care: the central 
importance of the agency relationship between patient and health 
professional.  This feature will be seen to be vital throughout the discussion 
that follows. 
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Explaining Too Much Medicine – Insights from Economics 
 
Why, then, do we appear to misconsume health care, giving rise to the 
problem of “too much medicine”?  From the demand side, we explore whether 
this is the result of moral hazard.  The supply-side concepts of supplier 
induced demand, the role of payment systems, cost-effectiveness analysis, 
and the “medical arms race” are then reviewed. This section concludes by 
examining the application of behavioural economics in this field, and the 
related concept of competitive or positional competition. 
 
Moral Hazard 
 
Moral hazard describes the general tendency for the presence of insurance to 
undermine the incentives to prevent or minimise the cost of the insured risk 
occurring.  In health insurance, moral hazard is more generally referred to as 
the tendency for individuals to consume more health care when they are 
insured than they would have done without insurance – because they now 
face a lower marginal cost of care than if they were uninsured (Pauly 1968). 
That insurance increases health care utilisation is uncontroversial, 
theoretically and empirically, and where the benefits of this increased 
utilisation do not exceed its costs, this will have a negative impact on welfare 
(Frick & Chernew 2009), potentially representing a form of misconsumption.  
However, Frick and Chernew identify a range of factors which may mean that 
moral hazard does not, in fact, lead to welfare-reducing overconsumption of 
care. They argue that there is no a priori reason to believe that the quantity of 
health care that would be purchased without insurance is efficient or optimal.  
Given the major departures from the competitive market model that 
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characterise health care markets, they argue that insurance may inherently be 
a superior “second best” solution, because the conditions for market optimality 
do not exist in reality.  Finally, they cite a range of evidence that insurance 
supports individuals to consume effective and welfare-enhancing treatments, 
and that removal of insurance (or the existence of high co-payments) 
indiscriminately reduces use of both high and low value treatments.   These 
conclusions appear to have been borne out by the US experience of  
“consumer directed care” (an attempt to design health plans that minimise 
moral hazard through both financial and information features).  Consumer 
directed health plans appear to have decreased overall expenditures, but not 
to discriminate well between necessary care and low value care (Bundorf 
2016; Buntin et al. 2011).    
 
Supplier Induced Demand 
 
A recent systematic review of the literature on supplier induced demand (SID) 
(Leonard, Storduer & Roberfroid 2009, pp. 121-122) defines it as “…the 
phenomenon of physicians deviating from their agency responsibilities to 
provide unnecessary care with the main objective of increasing their own 
pecuniary resources.”  Their review concludes that, from the 25 studies 
ultimately included, the existence of SID is a “straightforward” finding, with 
strong supporting evidence.  Broadly, they concluded that, as the supply of 
physicians (or “physician density”) for a given population increases, 
physicians will increase the number of interventions or treatments per patient, 
to maintain a target income in the face of increased competition. 
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The existence of SID has a number of potentially significant implications for 
the overconsumption of health care.  Its existence suggests that the observed 
outcomes of health care markets “…may have more to do with producer 
rather than consumer welfare” (Peacock & Richardson 2007, p. 268).  It 
suggests that power and asymmetric information enable physicians to induce 
demand by recommending procedures or interventions even when the clinical 
evidence suggests that the costs of the procedure to patients outweigh the 
benefits (Dranove 1988), and is therefore evidence that physicians are not 
constrained to work as anywhere near perfect agents for patients (Stano 
1987).  Interestingly, the SID literature has generally not investigated the 
consequences of SID for patients and society in any detail (Leonard, Storduer 
& Roberfroid 2009), with one notable exception (Labelle, Stoddart & Rice 
1994).  Labelle et al set out a conceptual framework which allows 
consideration of the circumstances in which “induced” services do or do not 
contribute positively to the patient’s health status, which potentially allows for 
the identification of that subset of SID which would constitute misconsumption.  
 
 
Payments and Financial Incentives 
 
It has long been recognised that different provider payment mechanisms and 
systems can generate different levels of utilisation.  Two recent reviews 
provide excellent overviews of common health care provider payment 
mechanisms and the likely impacts they may have on utilisation rates in both 
primary health care and hospital systems (Langenbrunner, Cashin & 
O'Dougherty 2009; Robertson, Rose & Kesselheim 2012).  In broad terms, 
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they show how line-item or global budgets and salaried payment systems 
tend to encourage under provision; capitation-based systems may incentivise 
underutilisation or risk selection and “cream-skimming”; while fee-for-service, 
case-based and per diem payment systems tend to encourage overutilisation.  
Importantly, they note that different provider payment methods are often 
combined in different permutations to attempt to mitigate some of the various 
negative effects that individual methods may bring.  Similarly, Deber et al 
(Deber, Hollander & Jacobs 2008) provide a useful discussion of how health 
care payment mechanisms must be linked to consideration of the extent to 
which any given system seeks to focus on meeting either “needs” (a 
normatively based assessment of health care requirements) or “demand” 
(driven by willingness and ability to pay for care).    
 
While these discussions make it clear that a well-designed payment system 
should seek both to avoid incentives towards unnecessary overutilisation and 
to avoid rewarding or incentivizing under-utilisation (Langenbrunner, Cashin & 
O'Dougherty 2009), it is less clear whether payment systems can really be 
“fine-tuned” in this regard.   In particular, experience to date with payment for 
performance or quality systems (P4P) suggests they may not be as 
discriminating as hoped for in their beneficial effects on provider behaviours 
and utilisation levels (Robertson, Rose & Kesselheim 2012), or in weeding out 
“low value care” (Schwartz et al. 2014). 
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Beyond the direct action of payment mechanisms, Robertson et al (2012) also 
summarise the available evidence on the existence of other forms of financial 
conflict of interest which may affect health care providers’ clinical behaviour.  
They identify strong evidence of substantial impacts on clinical decision-
making when physicians can self-refer patients to themselves for specialised 
service provision, and when they can refer patients to facilities or services in 
which they own a stake – showing that such direct financial incentives can 
drive excess utilisation when compared to the referral patterns of physicians 
without these conflicts of interest.  They also summarise clear evidence that a 
range of inducements from pharmaceutical manufacturers have been shown 
to impact on physician prescribing behaviour, even though physicians are 
typically unaware that their behaviour is altered by these incentives.   
 
 
Cost-Effectiveness and Low Value Care 
 
Overconsumption of health care will tend to be dominated by more cost-
effective intervention options, as overtreatment generally represents wasteful 
and cost-ineffective care.  Given that cost-effectiveness analysis has been 
increasingly deployed through systematic approaches to health technology 
assessment (HTA) in a growing number of countries, it might be reasonable to 
assume that one of the targets that well-designed HTA processes should seek 
to sift out should be overdiagnosis and overtreatment.   
 
However, it has been observed (Bryan, Mitton & Donaldson 2014) that HTA 
focuses overwhelmingly on the adoption of new technology, with scarcely any 
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attention paid to what they describe as “technology management” of existing 
interventions.  This gives rise to a major asymmetry between well-funded and 
exhaustively developed processes for assessing new technologies, and 
shoestring or non-existent processes to guide disinvestment from existing (but 
lower value) technologies (Elshaug et al. 2007).  Bryan et al (2014) point out 
the potential dangers of this systemic bias, which effectively means that new 
technologies are only assessed once, on entry to the system, and are not 
subsequently reviewed or managed once in the system.  They note particular 
dangers from “indication creep” – the phenomenon by which a technology is 
initially assessed and adopted for use in a specific indication and group of 
patients, but subsequently spreads to wider patient groups and indications, 
with no further assessment of cost-effectiveness, which may be a key 
contributor to technology-driven health care cost growth. They also suggest 
we should beware of technologies subsequently failing to deliver the benefits 
promised in their initial HTA evaluations once they are deployed at scale in 
routine practice.  
 
An empirical challenge for cost-effectiveness analysis and HTA systems 
generally is to develop the capability for assessing the relative costs and 
effectiveness of interventions in different populations, for different indications, 
and for differing treatment thresholds, once technologies are already 
approved and in use.  While there are some interventions that simply should 
not ever be provided to anyone, these are a tiny minority, and likely to be 
relatively insignificant in cost terms (Duckett, SJ, Breadon & Romanes 2015; 
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Schwartz et al. 2014).  The greater prize requires scaling back low value care 
(Elshaug et al. 2007), which will require nuanced and sensitive analyses to 
indicate the groups and thresholds in which interventions are more or less 
cost-effective.  
 
The “Medical Arms Race” 
A small literature from the United States during the 1980s and 1990s 
considered a phenomenon popularised as the “medical arms race.”  Robinson 
and Luft (1985) noted that – contrary to standard economic theory – hospitals 
in more competitive markets appeared to have higher costs than hospitals 
with greater monopoly power.  They hypothesised that a possible explanation 
for this phenomenon involved inflationary increases in investment in 
technology and service intensity to retain market share and physician loyalty 
(Robinson & Luft 1985), representing a form of “quality competition” in which 
“quality” is overproduced through competitive strategy (Dranove, Shanley & 
Simon 1992).  The extent to which empirical evidence supported this 
hypothesis was contested by Robinson, Dranove and their respective 
collaborators.  Interest in the issue waned as changes to reimbursement 
systems and the rise of managed care changed market incentives in the USA, 
but the possible return of elements of the medical arms race has been noted 
since (Devers, Brewster & Casalino 2003).  
 
Behavioural Economics and Health Care 
A different set of insights as to why misconsumption of health care may occur 
is provided by the behavioural economics (or behavioural theory) literature.  
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Over the last three to four decades, increasing evidence has shown that the 
traditional economic model of the consumer as a rational maximiser simply 
does not explain actual consumer behaviour, building on earlier ideas of 
“bounded rationality” and the existence of a variety of mental illusions which 
affect actual decision-making (Thaler 1980).  
 
Strong evidence shows that individuals consistently display “loss aversion”, 
that is they place a higher value on avoiding a loss than on receiving a gain of 
equivalent monetary value (Rabin 1998).  From loss aversion comes the 
concept of “regret theory”, whereby individuals anticipate possible feelings of 
regret that might be the consequence of making the wrong choice in a 
decision process; this “anticipatory regret” then influences their choice, with a 
strong bias towards minimising potential regret. The scope for regret in 
medicine is particularly high – uncertainty (e.g. about the patient’s true 
diagnosis) is rife, and the stakes of error are high for patients (Frank 2004).  
One study explicitly applies regret theory, and the concept of “acceptable 
regret”, to clinical decision making, in the form of clinical decisions about 
diagnostic testing (Hozo & Djulbegovic 2008).  They concluded that their 
model could explain why different (and apparently excessive) use of 
diagnostic testing could in fact represent an entirely rational attempt by 
physicians to moderate their potential regret to acceptable levels. 
 
Djulbegovic and Paul (2011) explored the inherent limitations of applying 
general (and often incomplete) evidence to specific patients.  It is not possible 
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to provide comprehensive evidence on effectiveness and cost-effectiveness 
for every eventuality, and clinicians are constantly forced to use inductive 
reasoning to extrapolate from the available evidence to patients who differ 
from those on whom trials have been performed (Djulbegovic & Paul 2011).  
This unavoidable uncertainty is a major force driving variations in practice.  
They argued that clinicians’ responses to this uncertainty in turn drive 
“indication creep” (the practice of promoting the use of an intervention for off-
label indications) and “prevention creep” (the promotion of tests originally 
developed to detect symptomatic disease in asymptomatic patients) – both of 
which will then be promoted by industries who will profit from increased 
utilisation and sales.  Physicians’ honest but fallible efforts to deal with 
imperfect information then combine with their desire to minimise regret as 
discussed above: they are much more willing to tolerate false-positive errors 
(“regret of commission”) than false-negative errors (“regret of omission”), and 
interpret limited efficacy evidence liberally, leading to overtreatment 
(Djulbegovic & Paul 2011).  Unavoidable uncertainty at the individual level 
may thus lead to overtreatment – both individually and in aggregate. 
 
A final area of insight from the behavioural economics literature concerns the 
role of biases and heuristics in guiding clinical behaviour.  Rabin (1998) 
summarises a range of biases documented through experimental evidence 
which might be expected to impact adversely on clinical decision-making, 
including anchoring to initial (but perhaps wholly inappropriate) levels, failure 
to account adequately for small numbers or the likelihood of regression to the 
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mean, belief perseverance, confirmation bias, hindsight bias and 
overconfidence in our own judgement or capabilities (Rabin & Schrag 1999).  
At the same time, a consistent theme from behavioural science is that human 
behaviour “…is driven predominantly by automatic and habitual responses, 
rather than reflective and goal-directed processes” (Fletcher 2014, p. 158).   
 
Competitive and Positional Consumption 
One potential explanation for aggregate overconsumption that has received 
wide attention in the ecological economics literature over the years shares 
common links with the beginnings of the behavioural economics movement 
(Scitovsky 1992).  This concept has gone by a number of names, all of which 
are identifiably related: “positional consumption” (Hirsch 1977),  “status 
consumption” (Scitovsky 1992), “consumption externalities” (Dupor & Liu 
2003), or “status races” (Clark, Frijters & Shields 2008). 
 
This theory proceeds from the insight that “…as the level of average 
consumption rises, an increasing portion of consumption takes on a social as 
well as an individual aspect.  That is to say, the satisfaction that individuals 
derive from goods and services depends in increasing measure not only on 
their own consumption but on consumption by others as well” (Hirsch 1977, p. 
2).  As a result, an individual’s utility depends not just on their absolute 
consumption and its direct benefit to them, but on their consumption relative to 
others, because a key driver of utility is the desire for social status (Clark, 
Frijters & Shields 2008; Scitovsky 1992).  The goods and services being 
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consumed are therefore serving partly as proxies for the social status that 
individuals really wish to convey. This leads to a trap for both individuals and 
society: as incomes rise, people will chase each other in consuming more – 
but derive no lasting increase in utility because others’ consumption has also 
risen, so their relative status is essentially unchanged (Clark, Frijters & 
Shields 2008). They become habituated to status and are highly averse to 
loss of status – an upwards ratchet (Scitovsky 1992). In aggregate, this 
“jealousy” consumption externality (Dupor & Liu 2003) leads to an equilibrium 
consumption level higher than the socially optimal level of material 
consumption were status or positional competition not in play.  
 
It is not immediately clear that consumption of health care may be competitive 
between individual patients.  If, however, the agent of consumption is not the 
patient, but their physician or health care provider – as much of the core 
evidence from health economics indeed indicates – it is possible to see a 
greater role for a status or positional component in driving overconsumption or 
misconsumption of health care.  It is not difficult to see how physicians might 
perceive their personal professional status and prestige to be significantly 
impacted by their ability to offer the newest or “best” treatments, technology 
and equipment.  Indeed, this effect would not necessarily require any link to 
pecuniary gain to operate.  If a professional culture exists which sees access 
to the latest technologies and interventions as intrinsically representing “best 
practice”, concern for professional status alone could provide a powerful 
incentive to overtreat.  Indeed, Pita Barros, Gouveia Pinto & Machado (1999) 
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used a simple game theory model to explain how excessive investment in and 
use of technology could occur when health care providers use medical 
technology as a proxy signal for their (intrinsically unobservable) true quality 
and skill (“identity signalling”).  They then explained how this could lead to 
overconsumption of health care and the adoption of technologies of limited or 
poor cost-effectiveness. It seems plausible to argue that some of the 
tendencies towards overtreatment described above (especially the “medical 
arms race”) could be explained in part by “status races” within the medical 
profession.  
 
 
Discussion – Synthesising Economic Perspectives on 
Overconsumption 
 
This review has considered a range of perspectives on overconsumption, 
from health economics, behavioural economics and ecological economics.   A 
synthesis of its most important findings can be summarised as follows.  The 
long-standing tradition of health economics research since the 1960s has 
provided clear evidence that physicians do not act as perfect agents for 
patients, and that the provision of unnecessary services under certain 
circumstances is one manifestation of this imperfection.  The behavioural 
economics evidence augments this finding with a rich set of insights on why 
actual practice may depart from that which an “evidence-based” approach 
(the presumed basis for any perfect agency relationship) would prescribe. In 
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particular, it provides strong explanations of why cognitive biases, habits and 
heuristics frequently crowd out “evidence-based” practice, in ways that may 
be challenging to overcome.  Moreover, behavioural findings on health 
professionals’ strategies to deal with uncertainty and to avoid potential regret 
provide powerful explanations of why overuse and overtreatment may 
frequently appear to be the “rational” choice in clinical decision-making, even 
when they cause harm to patients.  Meanwhile, status or positional 
competition can, when run through the principal-agent relationship in health 
care, provide a further possible force driving overuse. Figure 1 attempts to 
illustrate some of the potential relationships between the explanations 
identified by this review, displaying them in a space reflecting i) the extent to 
which decisions reflect imperfect agency or simply imperfect knowledge, and 
ii) the extent to which decisions are driven more strongly by individual or 
market / structural factors.   This preliminary overview suggests the possibility 
of fertile territory for further investigation. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here. 
 
Synthesising perspectives from health economics, ecological economics and 
the sustainable consumption literature appears to be a novel approach to 
considering health care overconsumption.  This paper therefore represents 
the start of a broader discussion on the economics of overconsumption in 
health care.  It has shown that the complex of  health care concepts grouped 
under the banner of “too much medicine” (i.e. overdiagnosis, overtreatment, 
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and overutilisation etc.) share the critical features of misconsumption 
(Princen, 1999) – that is, individual-level consumption decisions which do not, 
in fact, enhance individual well-being.  It also shows that several of the 
traditional fields of investigation within health economics (i.e. uncertainty and 
imperfect information, the agency relationship in health care, moral hazard, 
supplier induced demand etc.) have some ability to explain aspects of 
overconsumption in health care.  However, it is striking that the health 
economics research in these areas has had little to say about when these 
phenomena may be harmful for patients, with only Labelle et al (1994) directly 
addressing this question in detail.  In contrast, the central concern of the “too 
much medicine” approach is with the potential for harm caused by 
unnecessary care, just as the overconsumption / misconsumption 
perspectives are concerned with welfare-destroying consumption. 
At the same time, the fundamental importance of the principal-agent 
relationship in health care introduces a complexity not considered in the 
general sustainable consumption literature.  Its incorporation may provide 
powerful additional insights on how and why apparently rational individual 
consumption decisions can ultimately result in misconsumption. 
 
Implicit in the very notion of overconsumption is an excess of actual 
consumption beyond some underlying, lower level of genuinely beneficial or 
sustainable consumption.  Key characteristics of health care (Arrow, 1963) 
tend strongly towards a situation in which market outcomes alone cannot 
effectively resolve the problem of “how much is enough”.  Arguably, health 
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care thus represents a particularly clear case of a more pervasive tension 
between “efficiency” and “sufficiency” (Princen 2003).  This is recognised in 
health care; as noted, levels of desirable treatment are to some degree 
proscribed either through reference to “best practice” and “need” (as mediated 
by evidence or expert opinion) or potentially through the application of cost-
effectiveness thresholds, rather than by market outcomes alone.  Yet 
concepts of “need” will ratchet upwards in lockstep with technology unless an 
external constraint is applied; and how best to set cost-effectiveness 
thresholds remains a significantly contested debate amongst both health 
economists and policy makers (Cairns 2016). 
   
This exercise also suggests that some of the more traditional instruments that 
policy makers might reach for to tackle the problem of overuse in health care 
may prove to be less reliable or effective than we might wish.  Financial 
measures such as copayments and deductibles to combat moral hazard, or 
provider payment incentives or disincentives can and do reduce utilisation – 
but their ability to discriminate between inappropriate and appropriate care 
remains weak.   Competition must be handled with care, given the strong 
suggestion that it might frequently tend towards increased rather than 
decreased utilisation levels.  On the other hand, traditional behaviour change 
interventions aimed at clinical decision-making (e.g. clinical guidelines, 
decision algorithms etc) may also disappoint, given the powerful 
countervailing forces revealed by the behavioural research identified above. 
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This review also clearly illustrates the importance of understanding the 
behavioural factors that drive overuse in clinical decision-making.  Many 
complex mechanisms appear to be at work, implying that multi-factorial 
responses will almost certainly be necessary to make progress.  The 
sustainable consumption literature frequently focuses on the need for 
underlying changes in culture and values as a necessary precursor for major 
changes in consumption behaviour, with the implication that shorter-term 
“nudges” are unlikely reduce consumption effectively.  Given the nature of 
health care, the analogous approach in this sector may in fact require 
significant changes to the professional norms and culture of the health 
professions.  Princen (2003) offers a number of what he calls “sufficiency 
principles”, which he suggests could guide cultural changes away from excess 
consumption.  Two may be directly relevant for health care, namely restraint 
(“…a behavioural tendency towards using less than is physically / technically / 
legally / financially possible”) and the precautionary principle (whereby 
“…corrective action is warranted in the face of critical environmental threats 
even when scientific evidence is not conclusive”) (Princen 2003, p. 46).  
These principles might imply efforts to build a medical culture which values 
“watchful waiting” more highly than presumptive action or heroic intervention; 
which requires a higher burden of proof that technologies will be beneficial in 
any particular group of patients; and where the harm caused through 
overtreatment is viewed just as seriously as that caused by failure to treat. 
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This review also suggests that cost-effectiveness analysis and Health 
Technology Assessment (HTA) has the potential to play an important role in 
addressing the problem of overuse.   Cost-effectiveness analysis seems likely 
to continue to provide a robust and flexible tool for informing health care 
resource prioritisation and allocation decisions, which could allow the 
accommodation of a more robust approach to the harms of overtreatment, 
and potentially could reflect environmental or other negative externalities more 
fully.  However, while HTA remains overwhelmingly focused on adoption 
(Bryan, Mitton & Donaldson 2014), it is likely to fail to deter much of the 
pressure which is, in fact, leading to overutilisation.  The behavioural literature 
provides quite compelling explanations of the factors which may drive overuse 
of established interventions, especially “indication creep” (Djulbegovic & Paul 
2011).  HTA can only impact on this problem if it focuses much more actively 
on the management and reassessment of existing technologies, with a 
significantly raised bar to prevent this “creep” towards new populations or 
lower clinical thresholds.  This would require a finer-grained ability to measure 
and estimates costs and effects in different sub-populations, which may have 
significant implications for the kind of populations in which interventions are 
trialled.  Alternatively, a more pragmatic approach might combine a stronger 
drive to reduce optimism bias in modelling and analysis with a reduced 
willingness to extrapolate evidence from one population group or indication to 
another – effectively a more rigorous application of the precautionary 
principle, in order not to give potentially harmful overuse the benefit of the 
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doubt.   Both would represent more active regulation of “off-label” use and 
technology diffusion. 
 
More broadly, it is proposed that there may be real value in developing an 
inter-disciplinary collaboration between health economics and ecological 
economics.  This review has shown that the particular characteristics of health 
care make it a potentially important sectoral exemplar of concepts from 
ecological economics (e.g. “uneconomic growth”, misconsumption and 
overconsumption).  Conversely, concepts from ecological economics have 
potential value in examining health care (e.g. positional consumption).  Health 
care’s sheer scale requires the project of ecological economics to develop a 
better understanding of this sector, so that sustainable policies at the macro 
level support the best possible outcomes for human health.  Overall, the 
findings of this review suggest that viewing the problem of health care 
overconsumption through a variety of economic lenses can provide important 
insights to help guide future responses to this problem, and can bring 
potentially rich insights to advance the policy and research debates in this 
field. 
 
Some important limitations to this study need to be recognised.  First, this 
paper does not attempt to provide a systematic review of the very broad and 
heterogeneous literature under consideration.  Its purpose is simply to identify 
a range of relevant concepts and to commence a discussion on how they 
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might relate to each other, not to provide a definitive review of the evidence in 
any given field. 
 
A second important limitation relates to the strong focus in the literature 
reviewed towards evidence from developed countries.  The vast majority of 
the available evidence on overuse of health care relates to developed 
countries; and within that literature, there is a strong bias towards evidence 
from the United States of America.  Caution is therefore needed in 
generalising findings and implications across countries, and – in particular –in 
making assumptions regarding the (un)importance of the misconsumption of 
health care in developing countries. 
 
Finally, this review has not attempted to quantify the scale of 
overconsumption in health care.  To do so would require extensive additional 
effort, well beyond the scope of this initial, conceptual paper.  This additional 
work would also be necessary to allow quantification of the extent to which 
health care might contribute to “uneconomic growth” in aggregate terms.  
Developing quantitative estimates of health care overconsumption would 
therefore appear to be an important area for further research, from both the 
health and ecological economics perspectives. 
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